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I.

INTRODUCTION

Justice Seymour Simon1 wrote, “[T]he absence, or refusal, of

*JD, UIC John Marshall Law School 2021. Thank you to Justice Michael B.
Hyman, Dr. Ann Jordan, Judge Sheila Murphy (ret.), and Professors Hugh
Mundy and Michael Seng for all of your inspiration, words of encouragement,
and assistance through the writing process. A special thank you to my staff
editor and every member of the JMLR Board who took the time to make my
comment the best that it could be. This comment is dedicated to all of my
professors at UIC John Marshall Law School and Lewis University who taught
me that there can be no justice without recognizing human dignity.
1. Trevor Jensen & Joseph Sjostrom, Seymour Simon: 1915-2006, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE (Sept. 27, 2006), chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2006-09-270609270191-story.html [perma.cc/L7GS-CP9N]. Justice Simon grew up in
Illinois and graduated from Northwestern University’s law school in 1938. Id.
He rose to fame in Chicago’s Democratic party over clashes with other
Democrats, including Richard M. Daley, as he refused to follow party politics.
Id. He spent the first part of his legal career as an attorney and remained
involved in local politics before moving to the Appellate Court. Id. In 1980,
Justice Simon beat Judge Francis Lorenz, the party choice, for his seat on the
Illinois Supreme Court. Id. As an Illinois Supreme Court justice, Justice Simon
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reasons [for a sentence] is a hallmark of injustice.”2
A young, black man stands in front of a judge at his sentencing
trial. At nineteen years old, the judge and attorneys have decades
on him. He might be the only African American in the room. Police
officers found forty grams of cocaine on the young man, and a jury
convicted him of violating 720 ILCS 570/401. Section 401 makes it
unlawful for a person to possess a controlled substance with the
intent to deliver it.3
Now, his public defender pleads with the judge for leniency. He
graduated high school the year before and dreams of going to college
on a scholarship. His mom raised him as a single mother, and he
turned to dealing drugs in an attempt to help provide for his
younger siblings. He had never been in trouble with the law before
this incident. Police officers found no weapons on him, and nobody
has accused him of committing any violence. He’s a great candidate
for rehabilitative measures. In fact, he has already taken advantage
of several programs at the jail and plans on completing college
courses and job training while incarcerated. He has begun to mentor
other incarcerated youths at the jail. Justice, his attorney insists,
calls for the young man to be sentenced towards the lower end of
the sentencing range set out in 720 ILCS 570/401 (a)(2)(A). Section
401(a)(2)(A) lays out the legislature-created sentencing range for
the crime.4 For possession with intent to deliver fifteen to ninetynine grams of cocaine, the statute calls for six to thirty years of
incarceration.5
After listening to the Public Defender and State’s Attorney
speak, the judge states, “I’ve heard arguments from the defense and
prosecution. After considering the arguments and sentencing
factors, I think a sentence of twenty-five years incarceration is
appropriate.” The judge offers no other explanation for why he just
gave the young man a sentence longer than he has been alive.
On appeal, an Appellate Defender argues what Justice Simon
argued in his Davis dissent:6 The absence of a statement of reasons
is unjust. The Appellate Court, with its hands tied, dismisses the
argument because of a single Illinois Supreme Court decision:
People v. Davis.7 Ultimately, the court affirms the sentence, and the
young man emerges from prison, eventually, as a middle-aged man.
This hypothetical scenario represents the reality for many
wrote almost 200 majority opinions and nearly as many dissents. Id. He
dissented in all death penalty cases and repeatedly wrote about the
unconstitutionality of the death penalty. Id. He was the sole dissenter in People
v. Davis in 1982. 93 Ill. 2d 155, 163 (1982) (Simon, J., dissenting).
2. People v. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d 155, 163 (1982) (Simon, J., dissenting).
3. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/401 (2012).
4. Id. (a)(2)(A).
5. Id.
6. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d at 163.
7. Id. at 162 (holding that sentencing judges do not need to issue a statement
of reasons when pronouncing a sentence).

2020]

A Hallmark of Injustice

1011

individuals in the Illinois criminal court system.8 Illinois law does
not require sentencing courts to explain the sentence,9 which leaves
defendants dependent on trial judges to go above-and-beyond the
law and explain their reasoning. As Justice Simon noted in his
dissent in People v. Davis,10 Illinois denies its defendants justice by
not offering them any insight into the judge’s reasoning.
Illinois sentencing procedure differs from the systems in the
federal courts and several other state courts: Federal and other
state systems require sentencing judges to explain their reasoning
in imposing a particular sentence.11 Requiring a statement of
reasons: (i) encourages judicial transparency, (ii) promotes justice
for defendants, (iii) aids appellate review, (iv) better effectuates
legislative intent, and (v) provides a better fit of sentencing
procedures to sentencing objectives. Justice requires Illinois to
revisit People v. Davis and overturn the holding that allows trial
judges to pronounce a sentence without giving any reasons.
Part II of this Comment will discuss the background of
sentencing in America and the Illinois decision in Davis. Part III of
this Comment will analyze the effects Davis had on sentencing law
and compare Illinois sentencing law to that in other jurisdictions.
Part IV of this Comment will call for overturning Davis and
mandating that judges issue a statement of reasons with each
sentence.
II. BACKGROUND
Part A of this section will discuss the history and purpose of
sentencing in America. Part B will examine modern sentencing
objectives. Part C will discuss People v. Davis and examine both the

8. See People v. Bryant, 2016 IL App (1st) 140421, ¶ 30 (Hyman, J.,
concurring) (citing People v. Spicer, 379 Ill. App. 3d 441, 468-69 (1st Dist. 2007);
People v. Jackson, 375 Ill. App. 3d 796, 802 (3d Dist. 2007); People v. McDonald,
322 Ill. App. 3d 244, 250-51 (3d Dist. 2001); People v. Williams, 223 Ill. App. 3d
692, 701 (3d Dist. 1992)) (discussing the defendant’s twenty-one year sentence,
which was given without a statement of reasons by the trial court); see also
Jackson, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 807 (Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (discussing the twenty-one-year-old defendant’s twenty year prison
sentence)). Justices Hyman and Wright each vocalized their concerns over trial
courts failing to give a statement of reasons. Bryant, 2016 IL App (1st) 140421
at ¶ 30; Jackson, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 807. Hyman cited to a myriad of cases to
represent the reality of sentencing: Appellate courts uphold sentencing courts
who offer no statement of reasons. Bryant, 2016 IL App (1st) 140421 at ¶ 30
(citations omitted).
9. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d at 162.
10. Id. at 163 (Simon, J., dissenting).
11. Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law,
Too Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 691 (2010).
See also Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 59 DUKE L.J. 951,
963 n.43 (2003) (discussing the scholarly debate over the extent of jury
sentencing in colonial America because of the lack of historical information on
jury participation in sentencing).
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majority and dissenting opinions. Part D will explore Illinois
sentencing practices in a post-Davis world.

A. The History and Purpose of Sentencing in America
Sentencing in America began before the country even won
independence.12 During colonial times, the juries played a much
larger role in sentencing defendants,13 due to the colonies’ “deep
suspicion of judges” and the push to reduce the number of capital
offenses.14 The sentencing process was “virtually indistinguishable”
from the conviction process.15 When a jury convicted a defendant of
a crime, the crime usually carried a specific sentence under the
law.16 Juries, however, could change sentences when they felt the
severity of the punishment did not fit the severity of the crime.17
With the end of the nineteenth century came indeterminate
sentencing.18 Its supporters recognized that imposing long
sentences for the sole purpose of restraining convicted criminals
failed the community and the incarcerated individual.19 Judges took
a larger role in the process,20 gaining discretion21 but receiving very

12. Gertner, supra note 11, at 691.
13. Id. at 692.
14. Hoffman, supra note 11, at 963.
15. Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional
Rights at Sentencing, 99 CAL. L. REV. 47, 51 (2011).
16. Id.; see also Gertner, supra note 11, at 692 (stating juries often served as
“de facto sentencers”).
17. Gertner, supra note 11, at 692. But see Hessick & Hessick, supra note
15, at 51 n.12 (discussing the debate concerning the extent of discretion in
colonial sentencing).
18. Gertner, supra note 11, at 694.
19. Charlton T. Lewis, The Indeterminate Sentence, 9 YALE L.J. 17, 18-19
(1899). Lewis compared determinate sentences with “cag[ing] a man-eating
tiger for a month or a year” and then releasing it. Id. This corresponds with
more modern belief of prisons as “schools” for criminals, where those who serve
long sentences of incarceration learn to be better criminals from the other
inmates. Id. Lewis advocated for indeterminate sentencing for the sake of
justice for the convicted. Id. He also believed that indeterminate sentencing
protected the community as a whole from the convicted person “discharged more
the foe of mankind than before.” Id. The only justification Lewis noted for
incarceration is protecting the community from an individual who cannot live
safely among them, completely discharging the theory of incarceration as a form
of retribution of vengeance. Id.
20. Yan Zhang, Lening Zhang, & Michael S. Vaughn, Indeterminate and
Determinate Sentencing Models: A State-Specific Analysis of Their Effect on
Recidivism, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 693, 694 (2014); Gertner, supra note 11, at
694-95 (discussing the new role of judges as a power player in sentencing as
juries began “deferring to the professional judge”).
21. Gertner, supra note 11, at 694-95. Judges and parole boards had wide
discretion when sentencing a person convicted of a crime. Id. at 696. For
instance, a judge could sentence an offender to incarceration for an
indeterminate length of time, such as five to ten years. Id. at 695. Then, the
parole board determined the appropriate release time for offenders, focusing on
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little training.22 Judges became more like clinicians and focused on
rehabilitation through therapeutic means.23 Indeterminate
sentencing severed the conviction and sentencing stages,24 and
different rules of evidence applied to each.25 As judges operated in
a more clinical role, the rules of evidence did not apply at the
sentencing stage and the standard of proof dropped to “a fair
preponderance of the evidence.”26
Indeterminate sentencing continued in the United States until
the 1970s when it came under attack as ineffective at reducing
recidivism.27 The 1980s brought appellate review of sentencing,
which was largely nonexistent in the federal and most state systems
until that point.28 Because of this, trial judges rarely wrote
sentencing opinions.29 Even today, Illinois appellate courts largely
defer to a sentencing court’s decisions on review.30 Appellate courts
will, however, alter the trial court’s judgment when it is clear the
trial court abused its discretion.31
the safety of the community and the rehabilitation of the offender. Id. at 696.
22. Gertner, supra note 11, at 697.
23. Gertner, supra note 11, at 695.
24. Michele Pifferi, Individualization of Punishment and the Rule of Law:
Reshaping Legality in the United States and Europe Between the 19th and 20th
Centuries, 52 AMJLH 325, 327 (2012). See also Gertner, supra note 11, at 695
(noting that different standards of proof applied to the trial stage and
sentencing stage).
25. Gertner, supra note 11, at 695.
26. Gertner, supra note 11, at 695 (discussing the rationale that judges,
much like doctors making a diagnosis, should have access to any and all
information necessary to cure the “moral disease” of criminal behavior).
27. Zhang, Zhang, & Vaughn, supra note 20, at 695-96. In the 1970s through
current times, critics of indeterminate sentencing and other rehabilitative
measures assert that correctional treatment has no effect on recidivism rates.
Id. These critics largely base their assertions on a 1974 article which claimed
that “nothing work[ed]” with offenders. Id. (citing Douglas S. Lipton, Robert
Martinson, & Judith Wilks, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL
TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (Praeger, 1975)).
As more studies claimed treatment failed, politicians and lawmakers adopted
the mindset of “tough on crime.” Id. Spurred by the public, policymakers moved
away from rehabilitation towards incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution.
Id. Since the 1974 study that initiated the shift away from rehabilitation,
additional studies have come out from the criminal justice community
suggesting that the 1974 study was “overblown” and too broad. Id. The original
study labeled everything from incarceration to probation, therapy to leisure
time, as “treatment.” Id. When studies focused more narrowly on specific
rehabilitative measures, the studies concluded that rehabilitation has at least
modestly reduce recidivism. Id.
28. Gertner, supra note 11, at 696.
29. Gertner, supra note 11, at 697.
30. People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000) (stating that appellate courts
afford trial courts great deference when exercising their discretionary powers
over sentencing).
31. People v. Anderson, 112 Ill. 2d 39, 46 (1986) (stating a trial court abuses
its discretion when the imposed sentence is “manifestly unjust or palpably
erroneous” or the sentence clearly departs from fundamental law, or the
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The start of appellate review corresponds with the adoption of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1987.32
Some state
legislatures began enacting sentencing guidelines even before
1987.33 For instance, Minnesota enacted its guidelines in 1980.34
Congress and state legislatures sought to regulate sentencing
disparities35 and address the criticisms of indeterminate
sentencing.36 Congress created ranges from which a judge could
sentence for particular crimes. 37 Judges use the seriousness or
severity of the offense and an offender’s criminal history to
determine a sentence in that range.38 In Illinois, the appellate court
presumes a sentence within the statutory range is proper unless the
defendant affirmatively shows that it (1) “departs from the intent of
the law” or (2) violates the constitution.39
While some states have mandatory sentencing guidelines, the
United States Supreme Court and other states have held that
sentencing guidelines are merely advisory.40 In United States v.
Booker,41 the United States Supreme Court held the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment and stated
that when the court increases a defendant’s sentence, the facts
“must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”42 The Court,
and state supreme courts, interpreted sentencing guidelines as
advisory to avoid constitutional concerns, including separation of
powers concerns in some state courts.43 Instead, the Booker court
and state courts encouraged sentencing judges to weigh sentencing
factors and consider the purposes of statutory guidelines when

sentence is disproportionate to the nature and seriousness of the offense.)
32. Gertner, supra note 11, at 696.
33. Gertner, supra note 11, at 698.
34. Kelly Lyn Mitchell, State Sentencing Guidelines: A Garden Full of
Variety, 81 FED. PROBATION 28, 28 (2017).
35. Lydia Brashear Tiede, The Impact of Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
Reform: A Comparative Analysis, 30 JUST. SYS. J. 34, 35 (2009). Most criminal
justice scholars acknowledged the existence of sentencing disparity under
indeterminate sentencing. Id. Some, however, shift the focus for disparities off
judicial discretion in sentencing to prosecutorial discretion in charging,
pleading practices, the availability of defense attorneys, caseloads, gender, race,
and ethnicity, or region. Id.
36. Mitchell, supra note 34, at 28.
37. Id. at 29.
38. Id. at 29.
39. People v. Hamilton, 361 Ill. App. 3d 836, 846 (1st Dist. 2005).
40. Mitchell, supra note 34, at 28.
41. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
42. Id. at 231 (internal citations omitted); see also Gertner, supra note 11,
at 705 (“What was becoming more and more clear was that the judge was now
nothing more than another fact finder, rather than a sentencing expert
exercising any sentencing judgment, adding any kind of expertise. His or her
job was to find facts with determinate numerical consequences under the
Guidelines, a job which began to look more and more like the jury’s.”).
43. Mitchell, supra note 34, at 34-36.
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imposing sentences.44 The federal factors, found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), include the characteristics of the defendant, the nature of
the crime, the need for the sentence imposed, and the types of
sentences available.45

B. Modern Sentencing Objectives
As sentencing in America has changed and evolved, so have the
objectives of sentencing. Most legal professionals and scholars
prefer to use a combination of objectives when sentencing.46
Scholars and policymakers look at several different objectives when
discussing sentencing, including retribution, rehabilitation,
incapacitation, restitution, deterrence, and restoration.47
Some advocates have begun pushing for a move back to
rehabilitation and away from retribution.48 Rehabilitation focuses
on individualized punishment49 and seeks to improve the
functioning of the offender.50 It encourages prosocial behaviors in
offenders and emphasizes motivation, guidance, and support of
constructive change.51 Rehabilitation can include personal therapy,
educational and vocational training, addiction treatment, parenting
training, and any other programs or services that improve the
functioning of the offender and allow for an easier transition back
into society.52 A meta-analysis of hundreds of studies found that
44. Booker, 543 U.S. at 250. See also Gertner, supra note 11, at 705 (stating
that the Booker Court instructed sentencing judges to weigh different factors,
which included the nature of the offense and the history of the defendant).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
46. Robert S. Hunter, Mark A. Schuering, & Joshua L. Jones, § 1:1
Objectives of Criminal Sentencing, ILTRHBCRSN § 1:1 (2019).
47. TERANCE D. MIETHE, PUNISHMENT: A COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 4 (2003). Retribution focuses on punishing individuals who violate
social norms and is the main justification for punishment in modern sentencing.
Id. at 16-17. Rehabilitation is concerned with healing individuals and returning
them to society as law-abiding citizens. Id. at 22-23. Incapacitation proposes
keeping society safe by locking criminals away where they cannot harm society
again. Id. at 17-20. Restitution focuses on wrongdoers paying monetarily for the
damage they caused. Id. at 25. Deterrence gets split into two categories. Id. at
20. Specific deterrence justifies punishing the wrongdoer so that he or she is
less likely to break the law in the future. Id. General deterrence justifies
punishing the wrongdoer to serve as a lesson to the rest of society and prevent
others from breaking the law. Id. at 21. Restoration, a more recent goal of
punishment, emphasizes accountability, recovery, and minimization of
recidivism. Id. at 23-24.
48. Hunter, Schuering, & Jones, supra note 46.
49. Gertner, supra note 11, at 691.
50. Michael R. Brubacher, Third-Party Support for Retribution,
Rehabilitation, and Giving an Offender a Clean Slate, 24 PSYPPL 503, 504
(2018).
51. Mark W. Lipsey & Francis T. Cullen, The Effectiveness of Correctional
Rehabilitation: A Review of Systematic Reviews, 3 ANNU. REV. LAW SOC. SCI.
297, 302 (2007).
52. See id. at 301, 307 (listing several types of rehabilitation treatments).
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offenders who receive rehabilitation treatment showed lower levels
of recidivism than offenders who received no rehabilitation
treatment.53
An additional sentencing objective also exists: giving offenders
who have completed their sentences a clean slate.54 This objective
looks at the shame and stigma associated with being convicted of a
crime and sentenced to incarceration, suggesting shame, in
particular, can force an offender to contemplate where they fell
short of societal and moral standards.55 The “clean slate” objective
differs from other objectives that also focus on shame because its
supporters recognize that if shame continues after the offender
completes his or her sentence, it can cause them to withdraw from
society.56

C. Sentencing in Illinois: People v. Davis
The Illinois sentencing scheme has also changed and evolved
over time. The legislature enacted 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-50(c) (“the
Statute”), which reads:
REASONS FOR SENTENCE STATED. The sentencing
judge in each felony conviction shall set forth his or her
reasons for imposing the particular sentence entered in the
case, as provided in Section 5-4-1 (730 ILCS 5/5-4-1). Those
reasons may include any mitigating or aggravating factors
specified in this Code, or the lack of any such factors, as well
as any other mitigating or aggravating factors that the judge
sets forth on the record that are consistent with the purposes
and principles of sentencing set out in this Code.57
The Court had the chance to interpret the Statute in 1982 with
the case People v. Davis.58 At the sentencing hearing, the lower
53. Id. at 314. The same meta-analysis also compared offenders who
received greater versus lesser or no sanctions. Id. Offenders who received
greater sanctions showed only modestly reduced recidivism rates in some
studies. Id. In other studies, however, offenders who received greater sanctions
showed an increase in recidivism rates. Id.
54. Brubacher, supra note 50, at 504.
55. Id.
56. Id. Clean slate can be coupled with retribution to achieve reintegrative
shaming. Id. Reintegrative shaming conveys society’s disapproval of the
criminal action and punishes the offender. Id. After the process is complete, the
offender is theoretically “accepted and restored as an equal member of the
community.” Id. Reintegrative shaming has been included in Restorative
Justice movements and has “limited evidence” supporting its effectiveness at
reducing recidivism rates. Id.
57. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-50(c) (2021) (emphasis added).
58. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d at 158. This case consisted of two consolidated cases:
People v. Davis and People v. Alvardo. Id. at 157. Davis was convicted of rape
and robbery and sentenced to twenty-eight years and seven years’ incarceration
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courts failed to state any reason for the sentence they pronounced
in both consolidated cases.59 The defendants appealed, arguing that
the sentencing courts violated the Statute by not stating their
reasons for imposing the sentences.60
1. The Majority
The majority in Davis affirmed the sentences and held that the
Statute did not impose a mandatory duty on sentencing courts to
explain its reasons for imposing sentences.61 The majority stated
that, if the court were to hold that the term “shall” places a
mandatory requirement on sentencing courts, it would
impermissibly allow the legislature to interfere with Judicial
powers.62 This is comparable to the section of the Statute that states
“the court shall order a presentence investigation and report.”63 The
Court in People v. Youngbey64 previously upheld the section of the
Statute that requires a presentence report (PSI) and held that it
placed a mandatory requirement on courts.65 The Davis court
contrasted the two sections in its analysis regarding the permissive
“shall” in the Statute at issue.66
The Davis majority first focused on the beneficiary of the
protection of a mandatory PSI report and found that a PSI report
respectively. Id. at 158. Alvardo was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and
sentenced to seven years’ incarceration. Id.
59. Id. (noting that neither trial court for either defendant gave a statement
of reasons for the sentence each pronounced).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 162 (holding that the “shall” in the Statute is directory, not
mandatory).
62. Id. at 161 (stating that sentencing powers resided solely with the judicial
branch and the section of the Statute would be unconstitutional if held to be
mandatory, not directory).
63. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-2-6 (2021) (emphasis added).
64. People v. Youngbey, 82 Ill. 2d 556 (1980).
65. Id. at 558-61. The trial court convicted the defendants of unlawful use of
weapons in a bench trial. Id. The court allowed evidence regarding the
defendants’ prior convictions. Id. The defendants and the State waived the
presentence investigation and requested an immediate sentencing hearing. Id.
The State presented aggravating evidence regarding the defendants’ criminal
history. Id. The defendants presented mitigating evidence. Id. The defendants
were sentenced to terms of imprisonment and subsequently filed notices of
appeal. Id. In response, the judge, sua sponte, held the Illinois statute
mandating a PSI violated separation of powers by encroaching on the judicial
function of sentencing. Id. The trial court also found that the legislature’s
prohibition on waiver of a PSI violated separation of powers by encroaching on
the executive branch’s functions. Id. On appeal, the defendants and State
agreed that the statute did not violate the constitution by interfering the
functions of other branches. Id. The State, however, argued that statute did not
bar a defendant’s right to waive a PSI. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court held that
the PSI and report are mandatory requirements that “cannot be waived except
in accordance with the exceptions in the statute.” Id.
66. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d at 159-163.
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“serve[d] as a useful tool for the sentencing judge,” where a
statement of reasons only benefited the defendant.67 Next, the court
considered the structure of the PSI Statute, finding it persuasive
that the legislature coupled the term “shall” with the negative
limitation “not.”68 This required a sentencing court to adhere to the
statute before sentencing a defendant, or prohibited sentencing
unless the sentencing court complied with the statute.69 With the
Statute at issue in Davis, the legislature attempted to impose a
mandatory duty on the sentencing courts.70 This difference matters
because, at least according to the Davis majority, a requirement
relating to only presentencing, even if sentencing is contingent on
fulfilling the requirement, does not interfere with a judge’s ability
to sentence. A sentencing requirement relating to the actual
sentencing hearing does interfere with a judge’s ability to sentence,
according to the majority, at least.
The Court then turned to the Illinois Constitution.71 The
Constitution states: “The legislative, executive and judicial
branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly
belonging to another.”72 The judicial branch has the exclusive power
to impose sentences.73 The Davis court concluded that the statute
mandating PSI reports only related to presentencing procedure,
while the Statute at issue “attempt[ed] to dictate the [substance of
the] judge’s pronouncement of sentence,” which violates the
separation of powers clause in the state constitution.74
Courts have a duty to construe legislation to avoid finding it
unconstitutional.75 In order to avoid invalidating the entire section
of the Statute, the Davis court instead held that the “shall” simply
granted a sentencing court permission to explain its reason for
imposing a sentence.76 The court felt this left the discretionary
power of sentencing solely in the hands of the judiciary.77
2.

Justice Simon’s Dissent

Justice Simon, the sole dissenter, addressed the separation of
powers issues and voiced concern over the injustice of the majority’s

67. Id. at 160, 163 (citations omitted). By concluding that a statement of
reasons only benefits the defendant, the court converted the statement into a
waivable right, unlike the PSI report. Id.
68. Id. at 160.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 161.
72. Ill. Const. art. VI, § 1.
73. People v. Hammond, 2011 IL 110044, ¶ 60; People v. Phillips, 66 Ill. 2d
412, 415 (1977); People v. Montana, 380 Ill. 595, 608 (1942).
74. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d at 160-161.
75. Id. at 161.
76. Id. at 162.
77. Id.
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holding.78
Justice Simon noted that the framers of the State Constitution
did not intend for the separation of powers doctrine to create three
“rigid compartments of government.”79 Furthermore, the framers of
the United States Constitution intended the same result for the
separation of powers clause in the Constitution.80 Instead, the
separation of powers doctrine prevents one branch of the
government from controlling the others.81 Therefore, not every
blending of governmental powers constitutes a separation of powers
violation.
Additionally, Justice Simon noted that the legislature can pass
laws governing judicial practices as long as those laws “do not
unduly infringe upon the inherent powers of the judiciary.”82 He
then criticized the majority, suggesting post hoc reasoning in their
conclusion that the Statute violated the constitution.83
Justice Simon’s dissent continued by questioning the
majority’s logic in differentiating between this Statute and the PSI
statute in Youngbey.84 He asserted that this Statute has no effect
on the substance of the sentence, nor does it affect the trial judge’s
ability to pronounce the sentence he or she believes is appropriate.85
The Statute only requires judges to explain their reasoning after
they have already contemplated and determined a sentence.86
Justice Simon remarked that this requirement only impacts the
content of the sentence if judges have no reasoning behind their
sentences in the first place.87
Justice Simon proceeded in his dissent, pointing out times
when the Court upheld even more intrusive statutes.88 The Court
78. Id. at 164-168 (Simon, J., dissenting).
79. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d at 164-65 (citing Strukoff v. Strukoff, 76 Ill. 2d 53, 5858 (1979); Burger v. Lutheran General Hosp., 198 Ill. 2d 21, 33 (2001); People
v. Farr, 63 Ill. 2d 209, 213 (1976)).
80. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d at 165 (Simon, J., dissenting). James Madison’s wrote
of his concerns to avoid concentration of power in one branch of the government
and preventing branches from asserting control over another branch. Id. He did
not intend to create “rigidly separate” branches of government and
acknowledged that “some blending of power is inevitable.” Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing Youngbey, 82 Ill. 2d at 560).
83. Id. at 165-66. Justice Simon criticized the majority, stating:
Little more than lip service is given to [Youngbey’s precedent] . . . reading
the majority opinion, one gets the feeling that the conclusion that a
mandatory reading of the statute would be unconstitutional has been
reached before this standard is mentioned. No enlightenment as to why
this infringement on judicial power is undue is offered.
Id.
84. Id. at 166.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 166-67.
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previously upheld a similar statute89 requiring the trial court to
state on the record its reasons for committing a juvenile to the
Department of Corrections.90 Additionally, the Court in Youngbey
upheld a statute requiring PSI and PSI reports, which Justice
Simon argued forced judges to consider factors they otherwise
might not consider.91 Lastly, he discussed statutes creating
sentencing ranges and mandatory minimum sentences, which
courts have upheld and followed.92 Justice Simon stated these
statutes “strike at the very heart of the sentencing function that the
majority claims is ‘exclusively’ judicial.” 93
After attacking the majority’s logic, Justice Simon addressed
his fears for the future of sentencing.94 He voiced concerns that
sentencing will appear to be “arbitrary and capricious” without a
statement of reasons, which could cause public distrust in the
judiciary.95 He stated this will deny defendants any right to an
explanation for their punishment, circling back to the statement at
the beginning of his dissent— “[T]he absence, or refusal, of reasons
is a hallmark of injustice.” 96

D. The Aftermath of Davis – Sentencing in Illinois after
1982
The Court decided Davis nearly three decades ago, and
appellate justices have since voiced concern about its implications
on sentencing in Illinois.97 They encourage trial courts to more
thoroughly explain their reasoning and go above-and-beyond what

89.Id. at 166 (discussing Juvenile Court Act, 37 Ill. Rev. Stat. 705-1(5)
(1981), par. 705-1(5) (repealed 1987)). This section previously stated: “[w]hen
commitment to the Department of Corrections is ordered, the court shall state
the basis for selecting the particular disposition, and the court shall prepare
such a statement for the inclusion in the record.” Id. The legislature updated
the Juvenile Court Act in 1987. 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 405/4-750 (1987). No exact
match for the section cited in this case exists today, although 705 ILCS 405/5750 provides a close analogue. 405/5-750 does not require the court to state for
the record why it decided to commit the juvenile, it does require the court to
make specific findings about why less extreme means failed. Id.
90. In re Griffin, 92 Ill. 2d 48 (1982).
91. Davis, 93 Ill.2d at 167 (Simon, J., dissenting).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 168.
95. Id. (criticizing “a judiciary that is too busy fighting battles with the
legislature over an imaginary encroachment on its independence to understand
its relationship with the legislature and the people”).
96. Id. at 163.
97. People v. Davis, 2019 IL App (1st) 160408, ¶¶ 82-83; Bryant, 2016 IL
App (1st) 140421 (Hyman, J., concurring); People v. Jackson, 375 Ill. App. 3d
796, 807 (2007) (Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Jackson,
375 Ill. App. 3d at 804-05 (McDade, J., concurring); People v. Jackson, No.1-152720, 2017 WL 4127475 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 15, 2017) (Gordon, J., dissenting).
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the law requires to ensure justice and aid appellate review.98
Justice Wright, dissenting from the majority’s affirmation of
the sentence in People v. Jackson,99 discussed the implications of
Davis.100 After Davis, she stated, “trial courts seem to have
substituted the flexibility of the permissive ‘shall’ with a practice of
creating records that ‘need not’ demonstrate careful reflection prior
to sentencing.”101 She then noted that appellate courts affirm
sentences within statutory ranges, even when sentencing judges
give little-to-no explanation.102
Justice Wright103 insisted that sentencing courts not treat
sentencing as “an afterthought.”104 Justice Wright advocates for
requiring lower courts to explain their reasons for sentencing on
the record because of the constitutional requirement to balance
retribution and rehabilitation when sentencing.105 She states that
the Davis Court in 1982 did not intend for trial courts to completely
omit a statement of reasons.106 To conclude her argument, she
states, “It is reasonable to expect the trial judge to take a few
moments for a young offender, who stands before the court to learn
the nature of his punishment and the measure of his rehabilitative
potential.”107
In a concurrence to that same case, Justice McDade108 also
98. Davis, 2019 IL App (1st) 160408, at ¶ 82.
99. Jackson, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 798-801. A jury found the defendant guilty
of unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and unlawful delivery of
cocaine. Id. At the sentencing hearing, the court heard evidence in aggravation
from the State’s witness and read a letter in mitigation written by the
defendant. Id. The State presented evidence regarding lengthy prior criminal
history and made recommendations about sentencing alternatives. Id. The
defendant asked the judge to consider the defendant’s age, the police officers’
role in the criminal action, stating the police initiated the criminal conduct, and
other mitigating evidence from the PSI. Id. The trial court then said it
considered the evidence presented at trial, the PSI report, the defendant’s
character and criminal activity, and the hardship on his family. Id. The court
sentenced the defendant to three concurrent sentences. Id.
100. Id. at 807-08 (Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Wright disagrees with how the majority paints the trial court’s
consideration of the factors. Id. She directly cites the pronouncement from the
record, pointing out the brevity of the sentencing hearing in which the court
sentenced the defendant to one year less than the maximum sentence. Id. She
notes that the court did not state which factors, if any, it considered. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Appellate Judge Vicki Wright Biography, ILLINOIS COURTS,
illinoiscourts.gov/AppellateCourt/Judges/Bio_Wright.asp
[perma.cc/S9K66N5P] (last visited Oct. 12, 2020). Justice Wright sits on the Illinois Appellate
Court for the Third District. Id.
104. Jackson, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 809 (Wright, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Appellate Judge Mary McDade’s Biography, ILLINOIS COURTS,
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notes that sentencing has turned into an afterthought.109 She states
that absent a statement of reasons, the appellate court cannot
properly review a sentence.110 Justice McDade asserts that the
legislature intended to remedy that exact issue when enacting the
Statute, attempting to facilitate easier and more appropriate
appellate review.111 In agreement with Justice Wright, Justice
McDade states that she believes a statement of reasons should be
required.112
Appellate justices have also voiced concern over the injustice
done to defendants when sentencing courts do not offer any
explanation.113 Justices today believe that Justice Simon’s concerns
about injustice have come true.114 In multiple opinions, Justice
Hyman vocalized his opinion on the problem he sees with the
current sentencing procedure.115 He emphasized the importance of
defendants and the public trusting that the judiciary operates fairly
and unbiasedly.116 Without a statement of reasons, he noted, this
trust cannot exist.117 Justice Hyman encouraged the Illinois
Supreme Court to reconsider its decision in Davis, cementing the
idea that separation of powers concerns might not be at issue.118 He
addressed the majority in Davis directly, concluding that a
statement of reasons not only benefits defendants, but also the
State, the public, and the appellate court.119 On multiple
occasions,120 he encouraged sentencing courts to go beyond the law
and preserve the “integrity of the criminal justice system.”121
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, does not have to continue
to follow precedent for precedent’s sake. Courts can, and have in the
past, reversed themselves when they have seen fit.122

illinoiscourts.gov/AppellateCourt/Judges/Bio_McDade.asp
[perma.cc/6HK98433] (last visited Oct. 12, 2020). Justice McDade sits on the Illinois Appellate
Court for the Third District. Id.
109. Jackson, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 804-05 (McDade, J., concurring).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Bryant, 2016 IL App (1st) 140421 at ¶¶ 26-30. (Hyman, J.,
concurring) (stating Davis bound him to affirm the defendant’s 21-year sentence
for weapons charges but criticizing sentencing courts who failed to explain their
sentencing decisions).
114. Id. at ¶ 31.
115. Id. at ¶¶ 26- 30; see also Davis, 2019 IL App (1st) 160408 at ¶ 84 (urging
trial courts to provide more than a “bare bones recitation” of sentencing factors).
116. Bryant, 2016 IL App (1st) 140421 at ¶ 33 (Hyman, J., specially
concurring).
117. Id.
118. Id. at ¶ 35.
119. Id.
120. Id.; Davis, 2019 IL App (1st) 160408 at ¶ 82.
121. Bryant, 2016 IL App (1st) 140421 at ¶ 35.
122. Ilya Shapiro & Nicholas Mosvick, Stare Decisis After Citizens United:
When Should Courts Overturn Precedent, 16 NEX. J. OP. 121, 125 (2010-2011).
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III. ANALYSIS
Illinois’ requirement for a statement of reasons differs from the
federal requirement, as well as several other state requirements. A
statement of reasons serves many important goals, such as
increasing judicial transparency, ensuring justice, and aiding
appellate review. Furthermore, when a court fails to provide a
statement of reasons, the court fails to implement accepted
sentencing objectives. Lastly, a mandatory duty to provide a
statement of reasons does not create a separation of powers issue.

A. Sentencing in Other Jurisdictions
1. Statement of Reasons in the Federal Courts
Although federal sentencing law is not binding Illinois state
courts,123 states sometimes look to the federal system as persuasive
authority when making determinations about state law.124 Federal
law differs from Illinois law regarding providing a statement of
reasons and better effectuates the purposes of sentencing.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) controls federal sentencing law and states:
“Statement of reasons for imposing a sentence.—The court, at the
time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its
imposition of the particular sentence.”125 After Booker, a series of
cases, beginning with Rita v. United States126 chipped away at the
Sentencing Guidelines.127 These cases, however, did not alter the
123. Cf. McGrath v. CCC Information Services, Inc., 312 Ill. App. 3d 431,
438 (2000) (stating decisions of the federal courts construing State statues are
not binding on state courts).
124. People v. Thompson, 2016 IL 118667, ¶ 40-41 (stating that “[the court]
may look to federal law, as well as state decisions interpreting similar rules for
guidance”). The Illinois statute interpreted by Davis is remarkably similar to
its federal counterpart. Compare 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-50(c) (2021) (
“The sentencing judge in each felony conviction shall set forth his or her reasons
for imposing the particular sentence entered in the case.”), with 18 U.S.C. §
3553(c) (2012) ( “The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court
the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence”).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2012).
126. Rita v. U.S., 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
127. Id. at 381-82. In Rita, the petitioner bought kits online to build
firearms. Id. at 341. One of these kits, a “PPSH 41 machinegun ‘parts kit,’” could
be used to assemble machineguns. Id. Prosecutors insisted these kits
“amounted to machineguns” and InterOrdance, the gun company who sold the
kits, had failed to obtain proper registrations. Id. The Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) sought to inspect Rita’s machine gun
parts kit, and Petitioner agreed. Id. Before the meeting, however, Petitioner
sent his kit back to InterOrdance and gave the ATF agent a different kit. Id. at
341-42. In front of a grand jury, Petitioner denied that the ATF asked for his
machine gun parts kit and that he had spoken to InterOrdance about the kit.
Id. at 342. The prosecutors, claiming Petitioner had made false statements,
“charged [Petitioner] with perjury, making false statements, and obstructing
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procedural components of the guidelines, including § 3553(c).128 The
Court in Rita acknowledged that the statement of reasons
requirement “reflects sound judicial practice.”129 In fact, a district
court’s failure to give a statement of reasons is a reversible error.130
A sentencing judge needs to fully explain his or her reasoning if he
or she rejects an argument to deviate from the Guidelines.131 When
a circuit court of appeals finds a district court’s statement of reasons
inadequate, it can remand the case for a fuller explanation.132
The Rita Court explained that when a sentencing judge rejects
arguments from either party to deviate from the Guidelines, the
Court will require a more in-depth reasoning for the rejection.133
Even a sentence from within the Guidelines requires an
explanation134—unlike in Illinois, where a sentence within the
guidelines evades almost all scrutiny.135
justice.” Id. A jury convicted Petitioner, and the district court sentenced him to
33 months in prison based on the Guidelines. Id. at 342-45. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States, Petitioner argued that the district court
failed to adequately state its reasoning as required by § 3553(c). Id. at 356. The
Court held that, although brief, the explanation provided by the trial court
sufficed. Id. The trial judge discussed and rejected the reasons the defendant
wanted a downward variance, made clear it heard the government’s concerns
about public safety, and mentioned the sentencing factors. Id. at 344-46.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 356.
130. Chavez-Mesa v. U.S., 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1965 (2018). The district court
sentenced Chavez-Mesa to 135 months’ imprisonment for a drug offense. Id. at
1963. Under the Guideline range in affect at the time, he could have been
sentenced from 135 to 168 months. Id. at 1964. Chavez-Mesa asked for a
variance from the statutory range given his history and family circumstances.
Id. at 1966. The district court judge explained his reasoning, explaining that he
had consulted the Guidelines and considered the amount of methamphetamine
Chavez-Mesa had in his possession, as well as the danger of methamphetamine
to society. Id. at 1966-67. When the Sentencing Commission lowered the
sentencing range to 108 to 135 months, Chavez-Mesa sought a reduction in his
sentence. Id. at 1963, 1965. The district court judge, who had originally
sentenced Chavez-Mesa, subsequently lowered his sentence to 114 months. Id.
at 1963. The judge, after hearing arguments from Chavez-Mesa and the
government, said that he considered the motion, the Guidelines policy
statement, and the statutory factors. Id. at 1967. Chavez-Mesa appealed,
arguing the district court failed to adequately explain its reasons for sentencing
him higher than the statutory minimum. Id. at 1965. The Court of Appeals
affirmed his sentence and held the district judge’s statement of reasons was
adequate. Id. at 1963. Chavez-Mesa appealed to the Supreme Court of the
United States, which affirmed the holding of the Court of Appeals. Id.
131. Rita, 551 U.S. at 357.
132. Chavez-Mesa, 138 S. Ct at 1965-66 (citing Molina-Martinez v. United
States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016)).
133. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 357 (stating when judges reject a defendant or
prosecutor’s arguments to deviate from Guidelines, they will “normally go
further and explain why [they have] rejected those arguments”). When
sentencing from the Guidelines, however, a more succinct statement of reasons
will suffice. Id. at 356.
134. Id. at 356.
135. Bryant, 2016 IL App (1st) 140421 at ¶ 30 (Hyman, J., specially

2020]

A Hallmark of Injustice

1025

The Supreme Court has explained the importance of this
requirement.136 Deferring to Congress, the Court has noted
Congress’ intent to end excessive sentencing disparity and
encourage sentence uniformity.137 Ending sentence disparity serves
to increase justice for the defendants in a case. Additionally, the
Court stated that when district courts explain their reasoning, it
allows the Sentencing Commission to review and amend the
Guidelines when necessary.138 Lastly, the Court noted the
importance of public trust and judicial transparency.139 When the
public views a judgment as based on sound reason, it fosters public
trust in the judiciary.140
Although Rita and the cases that followed took some of the
force out of the statute by continuously decreasing the depth of
explanation needed to meet the standard under the statute,141 it
still stands, and some justices have argued to expand the
requirement again.142 In Chavez-Mesa v. U.S.,143 the Court
examined an appeal from a sentence modification, which it treated
differently than an initial sentencing proceeding.144 After the
majority found that the explanation given by the trial court during
the initial proceeding sufficed, Justice Kennedy wrote a dissent to
voice his concerns regarding the sentencing procedure in the federal
courts.145 He argued that the Court’s holding, which still requires
sentencing courts to give more explanation than Illinois under
Davis, went too far when it permitted the “terse, largely
uninformative” conclusory order to suffice.146 Justice Kennedy,
joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, recognized the importance
of such a requirement and argued against any narrowing of it.147
Even the majority, however, never contemplated abolishing the
requirement and following a law similar to Illinois.148
concurring).
136. Rita, 551 U.S. at 356, 382.
137. Id. at 382.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 356.
140. Id.
141. Michael M. O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentence Explanations:
Learning from the Wisconsin and Federal Experiences¸ 93 MARQ. L. REV. 751,
781 (2009).
142. Chavez-Mesa, 138 S. Ct. at 1968 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan joined Justice Kennedy’s dissent. Id.
143. Id. at 1959.
144. Id. at 1965.
145. Id. at 1965, 1968. The Court noted the statute governing modifications
does not require judges to give a statement of reasoning on the record. Id. at
1965 (comparing § 3553(c) with § 3582(c)(2)). Then, for argument’s sake, the
Court discussed the district court’s statement of reasons. Id. It held that even if
the statute required the district court to provide a statement of reasons, it did
so sufficiently. Id.
146. Id. at 1970.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 1966 (affirming that trial judges must adequately explain
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The Supreme Court, and some circuit courts, have also
interpreted and defined the boundaries of the requirement in
§ 3553(c).149 The district court judge “should set forth enough to
satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal
decision making authority.”150 The depth of explanation depends on
the case.151 When the facts are straightforward and the judge
sentences within the Guidelines, a more concise explanation might
suffice.152 In those cases, a statement that the judge relied on the
record, considered all arguments, and took into account the
Guideline factors will suffice for appellate review.153 In other cases,
however, reviewing courts will require more.154 Then, appellate
courts require more than a list of conditions without any
reasoning.155

their sentences). The majority found the explanation at the initial sentencing to
be sufficient when “the judge noted that he had ‘consulted the sentencing factors
of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(1).’” Id. at 1966. The sentencing judge then “explained that
the ‘reason the guideline sentence is high in this case…is because of the [drug]
quantity.’” Id. Additionally, the sentencing judge went on to point out “that [the]
petitioner had ‘distributed 1.7 kilograms of actual methamphetamine,’ a
‘significant quantity.’” Id. at 1966-67. He went even further to state “that ‘one
of the other reasons that the penalty is severe in this case is because of
methamphetamine.’” Id. at 1967. Lastly, the judge explained that “he had ‘been
doing this a long time, and from what [he] gather[ed] and what [he had] seen,
methamphetamine, it destroys individual lives, it destroys families, it can
destroy communities.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). Justice Kennedy in the
dissent found that by not requiring some explanation during resentencing and
imputing the reasoning from the first sentencing while the second sentencing
merely ticked boxes on a form, the Court narrowed Rita and the requirement to
give a statement of reasoning. Id. at 1970 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In Illinois,
however, the law requires even less than what Justice Kennedy viewed as a
narrowing of the requirement at the federal level by not requiring any
statement of reasons at all. Davis, 93 Ill.2d at 162-63. Appellate courts uphold
sentences without sentencing judges even stating how they are balancing
aggravating and mitigating factors. Bryant, 2016 IL App (1st) 140421, at ¶ 28.
149. Id.; accord United States v. Shoffner, 942 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2019);
United States v. Cookson, 922 F.3d 1079, 1091-92 (10th Cir. 2019) (citing
United States v. Lychock, 578 F.3d 214, 220) (stating that a brief or limited
explanations prevents a reviewing court from assuring the substantive
reasonableness of a sentence); United States v. Pugh, 945 F.3d 9, 26 (2d Cir.
2019) (stating that a more in-depth explanation will be required if the judge
exercises greater discretion by going outside the guidelines or imposes a broader
range within the statutory guidelines).
150. Chavez-Mesa, 138 S. Ct. at 1965 (citing Rita, 551 U.S. at 356).
151. Id. at 1965.
152. Id.; Rita, 551 U.S. at 356; United States v. Moose, 893 F.3d 951, 960
(7th Cir. 2018).
153. Chavez-Mesa, 138 S. Ct. at 1965.
154. Id.; Rita, 551 U.S. at 357. See also Moose, 893 F.3d 951, 960 (holding
that obvious restrictions, such as requiring drug testing for a drug offender or
restricting contact with children for child abusers, do not need to be as
thoroughly explained as less obvious restrictions).
155. U.S. v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 846 (7th Cir. 2015).
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The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Shoffner156 illustrated
the framework for analyzing whether a statement of reasons
suffices for review at the circuit court level.157 Shoffner pleaded
guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon,158 a violation of federal
law.159 He appealed to the Seventh Circuit the first time on a matter
unrelated to a statement of reasons, and the Seventh Circuit
remanded and directed the sentencing court to use a lower
guidelines range.160 On remand, he argued for a downward deviance
from the Guidelines proportionate to the downwards modification
the first sentencing court had granted him.161 He focused on his
rehabilitation during his incarceration, noting more than twenty
certificates he earned and his avoidance of criminal behavior while
incarcerated.162 He also argued that the first sentencing court had
properly characterized his behavior when deviating from the
Guidelines and insisted that the Guidelines would be unfair in his
case.163
The Central District refused a deviation, stating it reviewed
the sentencing memorandum, the PSI report, and other
submissions.164 The judge then praised Shoffner for his good
behavior and efforts in prison programs before stating, “that an 84month sentence is still the appropriate sentence.”165 When Shoffner
asked why he did not receive a downward variance a second time,
the district court “referred briefly” to the statutory factors and
stated the sentence “was appropriate given Mr. Shoffner’s ‘history
and characteristics, given the circumstances of the offense, to afford
adequate deterrence, to protect the public.’”166
On appeal a second time to the Seventh Circuit, Shoffner
156. Shoffner, 942 F.3d at 818.
157. Id. Shoffner pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, and
the Central District of Illinois sentenced him to 84 months incarceration. Id. at
820-21. The Central District judge deviated downwards from the calculated
Guideline sentence, and Shoffner appealed. Id. The Seventh Circuit had
previously remanded Shoffner’s case for resentencing on a different issue. Id. A
different Central District judge recalculated according to the correct Guidelines.
Id. at 824. When the sentencing judge did not deviate downwards, Shoffner
appealed seeking “a downward departure parallel to the one granted in the first
sentencing proceeding.” Id. at 821. The Seventh Circuit’s analysis focuses on
this second sentencing hearing. Id.
158. Id. at 820.
159. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2019).
160. Shoffner, 942 F.3d at 821.
161. Id. The original sentencing court had reduced his sentence by half a
sentence enhancement for striking a police officer during Shoffner’s arrest. Id.
The judge had discussed at length the circumstances surrounding the arrest,
focusing on the fear and panic Shoffner might have felt. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 821-22. The district court also noted it did not review the
transcript more than what Shoffner referenced in his memorandum. Id.
165. Id. at 822.
166. Id.
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argued that the sentencing court failed to adequately explain why
it refused a proportionate deviation.167 The Shoffner court noted
that federal law “requires ‘an individualized assessment based on
the facts presented.’”168 A court must do more than “simply
[acknowledge] that it…considered the [presentence report], the
guidelines, the § 3553(a) factors, and both sides’ arguments, and
then [impose a] sentence.”169 It must offer some explanation as to
how it assessed how the statutory factors apply to a particular
defendant.170 The Seventh Circuit does not always require an
exhaustive analysis on the record, but more comprehensive
analyses allow the court to more accurately follow the district
court’s reasoning.171
The second sentencing court in Shoffner failed to adequately
explain its reasoning and left it unclear if it agreed with the
reasoning of the earlier sentencing court.172 The Seventh Circuit
noted the reasoning of the first sentencing court did not bind the
second court, so the second court needed to provide a statement of
reasons, as well.173 The Seventh Circuit required the sentencing
court to explain how it applied the statutory factors and why it
rejected Shoffner’s arguments.174 Applying this framework, the
Seventh Circuit remanded for further explanation.175
Had Illinois applied this framework, Davis and the cases that
followed would be decided differently. In the 1982 Davis case, the
Illinois Supreme Court upheld the petitioner’s sentence without any
statement of reasons.176 Shoffner stated that a sentencing court
must do more than restate sentencing factors, and the Davis court
failed to state any factors at all. The sentencing court also did not
explain how, or if, it considered the parties’ arguments. Shoffner
explained that reviewing courts will not require an exhaustive
explanation every time, but they will surely require more than
nothing. Under Shoffner, the case would have been remanded on a
procedural error with directions to offer at least some explanation
for the sentence.
The Shoffner framework aligns more closely to the framework

167. Id.
168. Id. at 824 (citing Gall v. United States, 522 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)) (internal
citations omitted).
169. Id. at 822 (citing United States v. Lyons, 733 F.3d 777, 785 (7th Cir.
2013).
170. See id. at 823 (stating “[w]e still cannot say, however, that the court
provided us with an explanation of its decision sufficient to allow meaningful
review. As a threshold matter, the district court provided little explanation as
to how it assessed the § 3553(a) factors in the context of Mr. Shoffner’s offense”).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 823-24.
176. Davis, 93 Ill.2d at 158.
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Justice Hyman suggested that Illinois adopt.177 In 2016, in Bryant,
the Illinois Appellate Court upheld a sentence where “the trial court
stated that it had considered the evidence at trial, the gravity of the
offense, the [PSI] report, the financial impact of incarceration,
aggravating and mitigating evidence, substance abuse issues and
treatment, potential for rehabilitation, possible sentencing
alternatives, and reliable hearsay.”178 Justice Hyman’s concurrence
noted that the list was merely a recitation of the statutory
sentencing factors.179 The majority in Bryant upheld the sentence
despite the scant reasoning.180 The sentencing court in Bryant
offered even less explanation than the court in Shoffner.181 If we
apply Shoffner, Bryant also would have been remanded for merely
restating statutory sentencing factors without analyzing how the
court applied the factors to Bryant. The court had sentenced Bryant
within the statutory range, but Shoffner still requires more
explanation than the sentencing court gave.
2. Statement of Reasons in Other States
Although a minority rule, a statement of reasons requirement
is not uncommon in state courts.182 Similar to the federal courts,
177. Bryant, 2016 IL App (1st) 140421, ¶¶ 32-35 (Hyman, J., concurring).
178. Id. at ¶ 27.
179. Id.
180. Id. at ¶¶ 16, 24.
181. Compare Bryant, 2016 IL App (1st) 140421, ¶ 27, 28 (stating: “[T]he
trial court stated that it had considered the evidence at trial, the gravity of the
offense, the [PSI] report, the financial impact of incarceration, aggravating and
mitigating evidence, substance abuse issues and treatment, potential for
rehabilitation, possible sentencing alternatives, and reliable hearsay” but never
explained how it weighed these factors), with Shoffner, 942 F.3d at 822 (stating:
“The court commented that Mr. Shoffner was ‘intelligent’ and ‘passionate’ and
further expressed that Mr. Shoffner had ‘taken advantage’ of the prison’s
programs, which was a ‘credit’ to him . . . , however, these efforts did not ‘change
the fact . . . that an 84-month sentence is still the appropriate sentence’”).
182. See Carter v. State, 192 A.3d 695, 734-36 (Md. 2018) (encouraging
sentencing courts to explain their reasons to better serve justice and aid in
appellate review); People v. Steanhouse, 902 N.W.2d 327, 335 (Mich. 2017)
(holding a sentencing court must justify its sentence to facilitate appellate
review); State v. Old Bull, 403 P.3d 670, 674 (Mont. 2017) (affirming a sentence
within the statutory range where the sentencing court explained its reasoning);
State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 273-74 (Iowa 2016) (construing its statute as
imposing a mandatory duty to provide a statement of reasons in order to aid
appellate review and ensure defendants are aware of the consequences of their
crime); Bradley v. District of Columbia, 107 A.3d 586, 599-601 (D.C. 2015)
(holding that a statement of reasons is intertwined with the right to allocution,
which implicates the due process clause); State v. Riley, 110 A.3d 1205, 1217
(Conn. 2015) (requiring all sentencing courts to provide a statement of reasons
on the record); People v. Boyce, 330 P.3d 812, 858-59 (Cal. 2014) (requiring
sentencing courts to provide a statement of reasons but barring defendants from
raising an objection to a court’s failure to provide a statement of reasons for the
first time on appeal); State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 706-08 (Tenn. 2012)
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almost a quarter of American state courts require a sentencing
court to explain, to some extent, their reasons for sentencing.183
These courts have noted the importance of the statement of reasons
for similar reasons to the federal courts, including aiding appellate
review,184 ensuring defendants understand their sentences,185 and
protecting judicial justice.186 Unlike Illinois, these states have
crafted their sentencing laws to reflect those concerns.187
For example, the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure require the
sentencing court to “state on the record its reason for selecting the
particular sentence.”188 The Iowa Supreme Court, in State v. Hill,
interpreted the statute as imposing a mandatory duty on sentencing
courts to include a statement of reasons.189 Without a statement of
reasons, Iowa feared defendants would remain unaware of the
consequences of their actions.190 The defendants would be punished,
but would have no insight as to why the judge selected that specific
punishment.191 The Iowa court’s reasoning in Hill contrasts with
the Davis majority.192 The majority in Davis found that the trial
court does not need to offer a statement of reasons on its own
because it merely benefits the defendant.193 It offered no discussion
of the importance of a defendant understanding his or her sentence.
In contrast, Hill considered a defendant understanding his or her
sentence to be of great importance and also addressed the
importance of a statement of reasons for the reviewing court.194
(applying the Supreme Court of the United States decision in Rita to Tennessee
state courts); State v. Harnois, 853 A.2d 1249 (RI 2004) (requiring a sentencing
court to examine the record, trial findings, the character of the defendant); Ford
v. State, 802 So.2d 1121, 1133-34 (Fla. 2001) (citing Campbell v. State, 571
So.2d 415 (Fla. 2001)) (stating “[t]he court next must weigh the aggravating
circumstances against the mitigating and, in order to facilitate appellate
review, must expressly consider in its written order each established mitigating
circumstance . . . . To be sustained, the trial court's final decision in the weighing
process must be supported by ‘sufficient competent evidence in the record’”)
(internal citation omitted); and State v. Miller, 527 A.2d 1362, 1367-68 (NJ
1987) (requiring a statement of reasons to aid appellate review).
183. See cases cited supra note 182 (citing cases which discuss disclosure of
reasons for sentencing from across the U.S.).
184. Steanhouse, 902 N.W.2d at 335 (stating that sentencing courts must
justify the sentence to aid appellate review) (internal citations omitted).
185. Hill, 878 N.E.2d at 273-74.
186. McCleary v. State, 182 N.W.2d 512, 521 (1971).
187. Id. (judicially creating a requirement for a statement of reasons).
188. IOWA CODE ANN. § 2.23(3)(d) (West 2021).
189. Hill, 878 N.E.2d at 273-74.
190. See id. (stating, “[t]his requirement ensures defendants are well aware
of the consequences of their criminal actions”).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Compare Davis, 93 Ill. 2d at 162-63 (holding that a statement of reasons
is a waivable personal right that the trial court need not offer on its own), with
Hill, 878 N.E.2d at 273-74 (holding that a statement of reasons is necessary
because it helps a defendant understand their punishment).
194. Hill, 878 N.E.2d at 273-74. The Hill court did, however, note that this
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Similarly, the Supreme Court of Nevada cited Davis in its
reasoning when it interpreted a sentence enhancement statute
phrased like the Illinois Sentencing Statute.195 The Nevada statute
that the court196 examined required that the sentencing court
explain the factors it considered, on the record, when imposing a
deadly weapon sentence enhancement.197 The court took a position
identical to the Davis majority and held that the statute violated
the separation of powers doctrine.198 Unlike the Illinois Supreme
Court, however, Nevada’s Supreme Court upheld the statute.199
After weighing the risk of intrusion with the legislature’s public
policy argument, the court held the statute imposes a mandatory
duty because “it serve[d] the laudable goal of ensuring that there is
a considered relationship between the circumstances . . . and the
length of the enhancement sentence.”200 The court then mandated
the lower courts to abide by the statute.201
Wisconsin also requires sentencing courts to provide a
statement of reasons on the record.202 That State’s statute requires
that “[t]he court shall state the reason for its sentencing decision .
. . in open court and on the record.”203 The statute like its Illinois
counterpart, states a “sentencing judge shall state its reasons for
sentencing.”204 Despite nearly identical statutory requirements,
and close physical proximity, Wisconsin imposes a very different
reason is secondary in importance to an appellate court’s ability to review a
sentence. Id. at 273. (“Second, and ‘most importantly,’ this requirement ‘affords
the appellate courts the opportunity to review the discretion of the sentencing
court.’”) (excluding internal citations). This suggests that, even though a
statement of reasons is a personal right for a defendant, it does more than
benefit the defendant—it benefits the court, as well.
195. Mendoza-Lobos v. State, 125 Nev. 634, 641-42 (2009).
196. Id.
197. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193.165 (West 2021) (providing “[t]he court
shall state on the record that it has considered the information described in
paragraphs (a) to (e), inclusive, in determining the length of additional penalty
imposed”).
198. Mendoza-Lobos, 125 Nev. at 639-41 (citing Davis, 93 Ill.2d at 159). Like
the majority in Davis, the Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that legislature
cannot “dictate the manner in which a sentence is pronounced.” Id. It held that
the portion of the statute placing the requirement on judges was an intrusion
on the judiciary’s powers to pronounce a sentence. Id.
199. Id. at 640.
200. Id. at 641.
201. Id. at 642.
202. WIS. STAT. § 973.017(10m) (2001-02) (codifying the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin’s decision in McCleary v. State, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971)) (emphasis
added).
203. Id. (emphasis added).
204. Compare WIS. STAT. § 973.017(10m) (2001-02) (“Statement of reasons
for sentencing decision. (a) The court shall state the reasons for its sentencing
decision and ... shall do so in open court and on the record”) (emphasis added),
with 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.570/401 (2021) (The sentencing judge in each felony
conviction shall set forth his or her reasons for imposing the particular sentence
entered in the case).
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obligation on its sentencing courts.205
Wisconsin’s requirement came about differently than the
requirement in the federal system and in other states that require
a statement of reasons.206 Wisconsin’s Supreme Court imposed a
requirement on the sentencing court to issue a statement of reasons
in McCleary,207 which the legislature then codified,208 and the
Supreme Court subsequently reaffirmed.209
In 1971, in McCleary v. State, more than a decade before Davis,
Wisconsin’s Supreme Court required sentencing judges to explain
their reasoning out of concern for judicial transparency and
appellate review.210 The court held that judges have an obligation
to explain their reasoning “in all Anglo-American jurisprudence.”211
In People v. Gallion, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reiterated the
words in McCleary, stating that they “are as true today as they were
when they first appeared.” 212 The Gallion court then voiced
concerns over sentencing courts ignoring the directive from
McCleary and the legislature.213
First turning to appellate review, the court in McCleary
discussed the wide discretion appellate courts grant sentencing
courts.214 The court stated that discretion should be based on
rationality and reasoning.215 In order to properly review a sentence
for error, an appellate court needs to understand the sentencing
court’s rationale behind the sentence.216 This discussion closely
resembles Justice Simon’s urging in Davis for sentencing judges to
explain their reasoning to aid appellate review.217
Additionally, the McCleary court did not find that a statement
205. McCleary, 182 N.W.2d at 522-23 (requiring sentencing judges to state
on the record its reasons for sentencing).
206. Id. Wisconsin judicially created its requirement for a statement of
reasons. Id. at 522. The McCleary court adopted the American Bar Association
Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences, which required
sentencing judges to state their reasons on the record in the presence of
defendants. Id. (citing STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF
SENTENCES standard 2.3(c) (Am. Bar Ass’n 1968)).
207. Id. at 521 (“It is thus apparent that requisite to a prima facie valid
sentence is a statement by the trial judge detailing his reasons for selecting the
particular sentence imposed.”).
208. WIS. STAT. § 973.017(10m) (2001-02).
209. State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶ 5 (2004).
210. McCleary, 182 N.W.2d at 521. Iowa and Nevada also cited assisting
appellate review as a reason to uphold and enforce their respective statutes.
Hill, 878 N.E.2d at 273; Mendoza-Lobos, 125 Nev. at 642.
211. McCleary, 182 N.W.2d at 521.
212. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, at ¶ 2 (stating sentencing courts “merely [utter]
the facts, [invoke] sentencing factors, and [pronounce] a sentence”).
213. Id.
214. Id. at ¶ 18.
215. McCleary, 182 N.W.2d at 519.
216. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, at ¶ 19 (citing McCleary, 182 N.W.2d at 512).
217. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d at 167-68 (Simon, J., dissenting) (finding a statement
of reasons facilitates appellate review).
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of reasons is a benefit only for the defendant.218 The Supreme Court
of Wisconsin recognized the importance of a statement of reasons
for the court system as a whole.219 A statement of reasons focuses
the sentencing court on the relevant factors and facilitates a more
well-reasoned sentence.220 Wisconsin’s assertion corresponds with
Justice McDade’s concerns in Illinois about sentencing becoming an
afterthought.221 By requiring judges to discuss their reasoning in
open court, the requirement ensures that sentencing does not turn
into an afterthought. This also helps an appellate court review a
sentence for an abuse of discretion, furthering its aid to the court
system.222
Wisconsin, like the federal system, also considered judicial
transparency when forming its statement of reasons
requirement.223 The McCleary Court stated, “[i]n all AngloAmerican Jurisprudence a principal obligation of the judge is to
explain the reasons for his actions. His decisions will not be
understood by the people…unless the reasons for decisions can be
examined.”224 Without a statement of reasons, the public has no
means of understanding the judge’s logic behind a sentence. Implied
rationale erodes the law set out by the court and legislature, and
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in McCleary and again in Gallion
directs sentencing courts to provide a statement of reasons.225 The
exact procedure that Wisconsin has repeatedly rejected, is more
than sufficient in Illinois despite the two statutes reading almost
identical.

B. The Importance of a Statement of Reasons
Like the courts in numerous jurisdictions, the American Bar
Association also encourages trial judges to provide a statement of
reasons when sentencing criminal defendants.226 By providing a
statement of reasons, sentencing courts (1) increase judicial
transparency, (2) ensure justice, and (3) aid appellate review.227
218. Compare McCleary, 182 N.W.2d at 522 (stating a statement of reasons
not only aids appellate review but also helps the “trial judge[] focus on relevant
factors that lead to their conclusions”), with Davis, 93 Ill.2d at 162-63 (holding
that a statement of reasons is a waivable personal right that the trial court need
not offer on its own).
219. McCleary, 182 N.W.2d at 522.
220. Id.
221. Jackson, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 804-05 (McDade, J., concurring).
222. McCleary, 182 N.W.2d at 522.
223. Id. at 512.
224. Id. at 521.
225. Gallion, 2004 WI 42 at ¶ 50.
226. People v. Bryant, 2016 IL App (1st) 14021, ¶ 32 (Hyman, J., concurring)
(citing ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 18-5.19(D)(b)(i) (3d ed. 1994)).
227. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 18–5.19(D)(b)(i) (3d ed.1994)
(stating sentencing judges “always provide an explanation of the court's reasons
sufficient to inform the parties, appellate courts, and the public of the basis for
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1. Increasing Judicial Transparency
The importance of judicial transparency can be traced back to
colonial America, when citizens of the new country still feared
returning to a monarchical government.228 When judges are
transparent in their decision-making, the public can examine the
sentencing process.229 This fosters and reinforces trust in the
judiciary and ensures a corruption-free process.230
A statement of reasons relates directly to judicial
transparency. 231 Judges may make “fair, unbiased, and
particularized sentencing decisions,” but without a statement of
reasons, there is no way to ascertain the motive behind the
sentence.232 An explanation from the judge guarantees that he or
she made a fair, honest, and unbiased decision.233 It assures the
public that the judge considered statutory standards in making an
objective decision,234 or at least increases the perception that judges
hand down fair sentences.235 Perception often matters even more
than whether a person agrees with the substance of the sentence.236
Transparency involves more than the public simply knowing a
judge’s decision.237 The public wants access to court documents, as
well as the ability to attend different proceedings.238 Viewing court
records, however, serves little purpose if the individual reading
them cannot understand the judge’s reasoning. If hearing the
decision no longer suffices, simply reading a decision with no
further explanation also will not suffice. It naturally follows that
the public requires a statement of reasons to fully trust in judicial
sentencing decisions.

the sentence”).
228. Bernard Chao & Derigan Silver, A Case Study in Patent Litigation
Transparency, 14 JDR 87, 88 (2014).
229. T.S. Ellis, III, Sealing, Judicial Transparency and Judicial
Independence, 53 VILL. L. REV. 939, 940-41 (2008).
230. Chao & Silver, supra note 228, at 88.
231. See Bryant, 2016 IL App (1st) 140421 at ¶ 30 (Hyman, J., concurring)
(stating “[t]he trial court may well have gone through extensive internal
analysis, but absent any explanation of the factual basis for the sentence, for
Bryant—and the public—his sentence lacks transparency and justification,
though the sentencing judge did not intend to do so”).
232. Id. at ¶ 31 (Hyman, J., concurring).
233. O’Hear, supra note 141, at 754.
234. Id. at 755.
235. Kappes, 782 F.3d at 845.
236. Tracey L. Meares & Tom R. Tyler, Justice Sotomayor and the
Jurisprudence of Procedural Justice, 123 YALE L.J. F. 525, 527 (2014).
237. Ellis, supra note 229, at 940-41.
238. Id. at 940-41 (holding that with advancement in technology, the public
has ready access to court pleadings and decisions on the internet).
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Ensuring Justice

Requiring judges to provide a statement of reasons not only
ensures they consider mitigating factors, as the law requires of
them, but decreases concerns of “racial and other bias,
vindictiveness, grandstanding, emotional reaction, and cognitive
bias.”239 Some overlap exists between judicial transparency and
ensuring justice. Forcing judges to confront the possibility of actual
biases guarantees justice, while judicial transparency increases the
perception of justice by the public.
A lack of any reasoning in sentencing puts justice at risk.240
Conclusory orders serve as a detriment to defendants and the
justice system, as a whole.241 Illinois sentencing law requires trial
courts to weigh all relevant factors when sentencing criminal
defendants.242 Appellate courts presume trial courts took mitigating
factors into account,243 but without some kind of evidence in the
record, the trial courts very well might not have considered the
mitigating evidence at all.244 With such a deferential standard,
ensuring justice requires a statement of reasons.
An explanation of the sentence, which forces a judge to go
through reasoning, corrects the anchoring effect that could occur
after a judge initially hears of a sentence length from a statutory
guideline, a prosecutor, or the PSI.245 A judge spends the entire trial
listening to the details of the criminal behavior but does not hear
the mitigating evidence until the sentencing phase, which could
lead the judge to discount the mitigating evidence.246 Requiring a
judge to go through their reasoning ensures the judge took the
mitigating factors into account.
3. Aiding Appellate Review
Appellate courts afford wide deference to trial courts when
239. O’Hear, supra note 141, at 755, 758.
240. See Chavez-Mesa, 138 S. Ct. at 1968 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating
Justice Kennedy had an issue with the majority’s holding because it created
difficulties for the defendants and courts in figuring out the sentencing court’s
reasons).
241. Id.
242. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209.
243. People v. Willis, 2013 IL App (1st) 110233, ¶ 123.
244. See Jackson, 375 Ill. App. at 805 (“In the sentencing situation, we are
not only asked to presume that the trial judge has considered the factors in
aggravation and mitigation but also…that he or she was aware of the relevant
factors. The report of the [PSI] report . . . is singularly unhelpful in addressing
the factors, particularly those in mitigation”).
245. O’Hear, supra note 141, at 758. Anchoring effect refers to the “large
body of research indicat[ing] that the articulation of a number—even an
arbitrarily selected number—at the start of a decision-making process may play
an important role in shaping the final outcome.” Id.
246. O’Hear, supra note 141, at 758-59.
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reviewing sentencing decisions because the sentencing courts sit in
a better position to know the facts of the case because they can
observe the testimonies and judge the credibility of the defendants
and witnesses.247 Appellate courts do review sentencing decisions if
there exists an abuse of discretion.248 By stating its reasoning on
the record, a trial court facilitates better appellate review.249
As stated above, Illinois sentencing law requires trial courts to
weigh all relevant factors when sentencing criminal defendants.250
Without a statement of reasons, an appellate court cannot
determine which factors, if any, a trial court considered when
sentencing a defendant.251 An appellate court that attempts to
review the sentence for an abuse of discretion runs the risk of
reweighing the factors, contrary to Illinois law.252
Furthermore, a court that does not wish to speculate which
factors the trial court considered or risk reweighing the factors
might remand the case.253 This runs the risk of wasting judicial
resources.254 In Chavez-Mesa, Justice Kennedy voiced concern over
what he saw as a chipping away of the federal requirement in
§ 3553.255 The same concern Justice Kennedy had for federal courts
applies to Illinois, as well. Illinois appellate courts that cannot tell
whether or not a trial court abused its discretion, and do not wish
to presume it did not, still could remand the case in the hopes that
the trial court will explain its reasoning. The judiciary has a limited
amount of resources, and remanding cases for an explanation uses
even more resources by creating a second sentencing trial.256 A trial
judge could easily avoid this at the front end by adding a few extra
sentences to a sentencing order that more fully explain their
reasoning.257

247. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209.
248. Davis, 2019 IL App (1st) 160408 at ¶ 57.
249. Rita, 551 U.S. at 357-58; Jackson, 375 Ill. App. at 807; Bryant, 2016 IL
App (1st) 14021 at ¶ 34.
250. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209.
251. Id.
252. Willis, 2013 IL App (1st) 110233 at ¶ 123.
253. Chavez-Mesa, 138 S. Ct. at 1971 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 1968-72 (describing the remand of a case for further explanation
as “an unwise allocation of judicial resources.”)
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
[W]hat could have taken a sentence or two at the front end now can, and
likely will, produce dozens of pages of briefs, bench memoranda, orders,
and judicial opinions as the case makes its way first to the appellate
court, then back down to the trial court and perhaps back to the appellate
court again.
Id.
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C. A Mismatch of Sentencing Objectives to Sentencing
Procedure
With a new push towards rehabilitation and away from
retribution,258 the sentencing procedure in place must match the
objectives. In Illinois, judges must balance “the seriousness of the
offense . . . with the objective of restoring the offender to useful
citizenship.”259 Rehabilitation focuses on curing the individual.260
Each defendant is viewed as an individual with a unique case and
story.261 As an individual, it becomes more important for defendants
to hear the reason for their punishment.262 In the alternative, it
becomes important for judges to understand why someone
committed the offense and what services they may need. In order to
rehabilitate a defendant, one must look to the learning theories
behind punishments that support a statement of reasons.
According to some learning theories, the immediate
consequences—the response immediately following the behavior—
are shown to be more effective at preventing the unwanted behavior
in the future than delayed consequences.263 Researchers, who saw
living beings as machines who simply reacted to the environment,264
first used rats in boxes to demonstrate this concept.265 It then
expanded to humans and can still be seen in the criminal justice
system today. The behavior, or the criminal action, receives two
types of consequences. First, the immediate consequences can
include the arrest, trial, and sentencing. Then, the delayed
consequences can include incarceration, post-conviction stigma, and
258. Bijan Berenji, Tom Chou, & Maria R. D’Orsogna, Recidivism and
Rehabilitation of Criminal Offenders: A Carrot and Stick Evolutionary Game, 9
PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2016) (stating the criminal justice system has made recent
efforts to treat and rehabilitate offenders).
259. Ill. Const. art. I, § 12.
260. See Gertner, supra note 11, at 695 (stating that “crime [is] a moral
disease”).
261. Gall v. U.S., 552 U.S. 38, 52 (2007).
262. Hill, 878 N.E.2d at 273-74 (holding that a statement of reasons is
necessary because it helps a defendant understand their punishment).
263. Paul Chance, The Ultimate Challenge: Prove B.F. Skinner Wrong, 30
BEHAV. ANALYSIS 153, 154 (2007).
264. Eugene E. Swaim, B.F. Skinner and Carl R. Rogers on Behavior and
Education, 28 OREGON ASCD CURRICULUM BULLETIN 1, 6-7 (1972).
265. J.E.R. Staddon & D.T. Cerutti, Operant Conditioning, 54 ANNUAL
REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY 115, 116-17 (2002); E-mail from Dr. Ann Jordan,
Professor of Psychology at Lewis University to Allison Trendle (Sept. 19, 2019)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Jordan E-mail]. B.F. Skinner, an early
proponent of this theory, used rats in boxes. Staddon & Cerutti, supra note 265,
at 116-17. Skinner placed the rats in a box with an electrical current running
through it. Jordan E-mail, supra note 265. To shut the current off, the rats
needed to press a lever. Id. After accidentally pressing the lever a few times,
the rats learned the lever controlled the current and began going straight to the
level and pressing it when Skinner placed them in the box. Id. The theory then
expanded to human behavior. Id.
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any other consequence that occurs long after the behavior.
The immediacy of the consequence increases the effectiveness
of preventing future negative consequences, such as criminal
behavior.266 However, delayed consequences can work if preceded
by a positive immediate consequence.267 A person incarcerated for
committing a crime might view the consequence as completely
negative. By providing a statement of reasons and facilitating
actual reflection, judges add meaning to the consequence which
causes the defendant to associate the consequence more clearly with
the crime. It follows that this increases the chances of effectiveness.
When the person giving the consequence—the judge—provides
a thorough explanation for the punishment—a statement of
reasons for the sentence imposed—the punishment across all delay
intervals showed an equal effect.268 Essentially, humans are not the
rats that learning theorists used in initial studies. We are complex,
thinking beings—even those who commit crimes. A punishment
without explanation might not suffice to deter future criminal
behavior because people learn best when they understand their
punishment.269
Social learning theories also provide some insight into
punishment. Humans tend to more closely associate with people
who share their ideas in order to avoid contrary opinions to their
own beliefs.270 Very few people, if any, want to be criminals—like
the young man in the hypothetical scenario at the beginning of this
comment. Strain theory suggests that individuals who fail to
achieve their goals through legitimate and legal means turn to
crime out of frustration.271 Criminal behavior, like good behavior,
then gets reinforced through social relationships.272 If an entire
community feels frustrated because they are unable to achieve their
goals through legitimate means, the criminal behavior individuals
turn to consistently get reinforced through social relationships in
the community.
In order to break the cycle of thinking, contrary opinions need
to be introduced.273 By incarcerating someone with other
266. James N. Meindl & Laura B. Casey, Increasing the Suppressive Effects
of Delayed Punishers: A Review of Basic and Applied Literature, 27 BEHAV.
INTERVENT. 129, 130 (2012).
267. Chance, supra note 263, at 154.
268. See Meindl & Casey, supra note 266, at 138 (describing the effects of an
explanation on delayed punishments in general).
269. Jordan E-mail, supra note 265 (discussing how learning theories have
advanced from B.F. Skinner’s theory of operant conditions); see also Swaim,
supra note 264, at 6-7 (stating that B.F. Skinner saw living organisms,
including humans, as “merely a physical organism” that simply responds to its
environment and does not think).
270. Chance, supra note 263, at 155.
271. Robert Agnew, A Revised Strain Theory of Delinquency, 64 SOC.
FORCES 151, 151 (1985).
272. Chance, supra note 263, at 155-66.
273. See Chance, supra note 263, at 155-66 (stating that contrary opinions
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individuals who share the same thoughts and criminal behaviors,
the criminal justice system fuels extremist thinking. By providing
an explanation, judges temper the social reinforcement a defendant
might receive in prison by injecting a contrary thought.
Additionally, social learning includes the integration of the
beliefs, goals, actions, and consequences of others into one’s own
life.274 Just as criminal behavior can be reinforced in prison by other
inmates, good behavior can be reinforced by a judge who takes the
time to impress society’s beliefs and consequences on a defendant.
By connecting beliefs to behaviors to consequences, the individual
becomes less likely to commit the crime again in the future.275

D. Addressing the Separation of Powers Concerns
One of the few instances where courts will construe “shall” in
a statute to be permissive rather than mandatory is when a statute
faces constitutional attacks.276 Otherwise, “shall” generally denotes
a mandatory action, not permissive or discretionary.277 The
majority in Davis discussed at length its concern that construing
the statute as imposing a mandatory duty on lower courts would
cause a separation of powers issue.278 The Illinois Constitution
contains a separation of powers clause, stating, “The legislative,
executive, and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall
exercise power properly belonging to another.”279 The Constitution
vests the judicial powers in the Illinois Supreme Court, one
Appellate Court, and the Circuit Courts.280
Courts have consistently recognized sentencing as an
exclusively judicial duty.281 This is because the Statute “attempt[ed]
to dictate the actual content of the judge’s procurement of sentence,”
and construing the Statute as mandatory would allow a legislative
interference on a core judicial duty.282 In order for the Statute to be
constitutionally valid, the majority held that the “shall” offered
permissive direction to sentencing courts.283
temper extremist views).
274. Joshua W. Buckholtz & René Marois, The Roots of Modern Justice:
Cognitive and Neural Foundations of Social Norms and Their Enforcement, 15
NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 655, 656 (2012).
275. See Meindl & Casey, supra note 266, at 129 (stating an explanation for
punishment decreases the likelihood of negative behavior in the future).
276. Leonard A. Nelson, Punitive Damages Under the Illinois Sales
Representative Act, 86 ILBJ 622, 624 (1998). Other instances when a court
interprets “shall” as permissive is when the statute’s language is unclear or its
context suggests a permissive intent. Id.
277. Id.
278. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d at 162-63.
279. Ill. Const. art. II, § 1.
280. Id.
281. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d at 161.
282. Id. at 160-61.
283. Id. The majority correctly noted the judicial branch has a “duty to
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Argument exists, however, that separation of powers poses no
such problem in a mandatory requirement of sentence
explanations.284 As noted by Justice Simon, and other judges after
him, the doctrine never served to completely separate the three
branches of government.285 Some overlap between the branches will
naturally exist because each makes up one-third of the
government.286 As long as one branch does not hold the entirety of
another branches powers,287 nothing prohibits that branch from
performing some duties of a different branch.288 The drafters’
concern centered around coercion amongst the branches, not rigid
separation.289
In fact, where the legislature does not “unduly infringe upon
the inherent powers of the judiciary,” it can create laws to govern
judicial powers.290 Illinois courts have upheld statutes that govern
the judiciary’s power over sentencing.291
Two years after Davis, the Court upheld a statute creating
mandatory life imprisonment terms.292 The Court attempted to
construe acts of the legislature . . . to affirm their constitutionality and validity.”
Id. at 161. To do so, the majority held the Statute as advisory. Id. at 161-62.
284. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d at 164 (Simon, J., dissenting).
285. See, e.g., id. (Simon, J., dissenting) (citing Field v. People ex rel.
McClernand, 3 Ill. 79, 83-84 (1839) (superseded by constitutional amendment on
other grounds, Ill. Const. art. V, § 12)) (stating that the separation of powers
doctrine does not call for the three branches of government to be kept so
separate that they have no connection or dependence on the other branches).
Justice Simon also discusses Federalist Paper No. 47, often credited to James
Madison. Id.
286. In re Derrico G., 2014 IL 114463, ¶ 76.
287. Id.
288. Elizabeth M. Bosek et al., Acquiescence in Constitutionality or Passage
of Time, 11 IL-LP CONSTLAW § 50 (2019).
289. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d at 164-65.
290. People v. Bryant, 278 Ill. App. 3d 578, 584 (1996) (citing Youngbey, 82
Ill. 2d at 560) (stating “[t]he General Assembly has the power to enact laws
governing judicial practices when the laws do not unduly infringe upon the
inherent powers of the judiciary or conflict with a rule of this court.”).
291. See generally Griffin, 92 Ill. 2d at 54 (upholding a section of the Juvenile
Court Act that required courts to state its basis when committing a juvenile to
the Department of Corrections); Youngbey, 82 Ill. 2d at 560 (upholding a statute
that held PSI reports mandatory and nonwaivable); see also Davis, 93 Ill. 2d at
167 (discussing the validity of legislative imposed minimum and maximum
guidelines).
292. People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 206-08 (1984). Defendants shot and
killed a man who had allegedly stolen jewelry from one of them. Id. at 204. The
trial court convicted the defendants of murder and armed violence before
sentencing them to natural life sentences. Id. at 203. The court stated the
statute required it to sentence the defendants to natural life sentences for the
crime they committed. Id. at 204-05. The appellate court found that a
mandatory life sentence prevented the court from considering, pursuant to the
constitution, mitigating and rehabilitative factors. Id. at 205. The appellate
court, following logic similar to Davis, held the statute was directory, not
mandatory, in order to avoid declaring it unconstitutional. Id. The Illinois
Supreme Court reversed and upheld the statute as mandatory. Id. at 206-08.
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distinguish Davis by stating that mandatory sentencing terms laws
fell within the “legislative power to define crimes and fix
punishment.”293 In doing so, it looked at the sentencing laws in
other states, including some that have a statement of reasons
requirement.294 As Justice Simon noted, this seemed to dictate the
actual content of the sentencing more so than requiring judges to
explain their reasoning, unless sentencing is entirely without
reason.295 Requiring courts to explain how they reached the
substantive portion of their sentence does not dictate content at all.
A mandatory natural life sentence, however, would seemingly
remove all discretion a court has over its judicial power of
sentencing. Although the law has some serious logical errors, Davis
continues as precedent today.

E. Davis as Precedent
As noted above, the appellate courts adheres strictly to Davis
as precedent and affirms sentences with no statement of reasons
attached.296 An argument exists to uphold Davis under the doctrine
of stare decisis. As discussed more in-depth below, stare decisis does
not prevent the courts from providing a statement of reasons.

IV.

PROPOSAL

As it stands, despite being contrary to federal law, almost a
quarter of states’ laws, notions of justice, and theories of learning,
Davis controls an important part of sentencing procedure in Illinois.
Justice requires Davis be overturned, either legislatively, which
creates its own issues, or judicially.
1. Overturning Davis Legislatively
“Congress is free to change [the] Court’s interpretation of its
legislation.”297 When the legislature disagrees with a court’s
interpretation, it can create new statutes that effectively overturn

293. Id. at 208.
294. Id. at 209 (citing People v. Hall, 242 N.W.2d 377 (Mich. 1976); State v.
Vaccaro, 403 A.2d 649 (1979)).
295. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d at 166.
296. Accord Jackson, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 802 (stating “there is no mandatory
requirement that the trial judge recite all of the statutory factors before
imposing sentence”); see also Jackson, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 807 (Wright, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating “in the two decades since our
supreme court’s decision in Davis, trial courts seem to have substituted the
flexibility of the permissive ‘shall’ with a practice of creating records that “need
not” demonstrate careful reflection prior to sentencing”).
297. Exelon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 234 Ill. 2d 266, 302-03 (2009)
(Thomas, J., specially concurring) (internal citations omitted).
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a court’s holding.298 In fact, legislatures and Congress have done so
in the past. For example, the United States Congress overturned
the 2008 United States Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Santos299 with the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act in 2009
(FERA).300 By reading the Senate Report, Congress’ intentions with
FERA become clear.301 Congress wanted to correct what it saw as
an over-limiting decision by the Court, so it amended the False
Claims act to include FERA.302
For the purposes of this Comment, however, even though the
legislature could revise a statute that the court held
unconstitutional, doing so here would not have any effect. Any law
that the legislature could create that would protect justice by
requiring a statement of reasons would only get struck down by the
court under Davis. This only leaves the Illinois Supreme Court
overturning Davis judicially.
2. Overturning Davis Judicially
Justice Hyman recognized the need for the Illinois Supreme
Court to reconsider Davis.303 While he urged the Court to create a
rule to “get around” Davis,304 the Court should outright overturn
Davis, despite stare decisis implications.
Stare decisis lies at the bedrock of American jurisprudence.305
298. The Court and Constitutional Interpretation, SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx [perma.cc/8K4KURU2] (last visited Oct. 21, 2020).
299. U.S. v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008). The defendant ran an illegal lottery
in Indiana for approximately twenty years. Id. at 509. He was convicted in the
Northern District of Indiana of running an illegal gambling business and money
laundering under federal law. Id. at 509-10. The defendant appealed, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Id. He then moved to collaterally
attack his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Id. The District
Court rejected all his claims except the challenge to the money-laundering
conviction. Id. A subsequent Seventh Circuit decision had “held that the federal
money-laundering statute’s prohibition of transactions involving criminal
‘proceeds’ applies only to transactions involving criminal profits, not criminal
receipts.” Id. (citing United States v. Scialabba, 282 F.3d 475 (2002)). Applying
Scialabba, the District Court vacated the defendant’s conviction for money
laundering. Id. The Seventh Circuit, affirming Scialabba, affirmed the District
Court. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed, using the “rule of lenity” which requires
ambiguous statutes to be interpreted in favor of the defendants. Id. at 514.
300. The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21,
123 Stat. 1617 (2009).
301. John F. Savarese, Ralph M. Levene, & Carol Miller, New Tools for the
Government’s Fight Against Financial Fraud, 60 NO. 7 GLSLR 13 (2009).
302. Id.
303. Bryant, 2016 IL App (1st) 14021 at ¶ 35 (Hyman, J. concurring) (“I hope
our supreme court sees fit to consider this issue and formulate a court rule to
get around its decision in Davis.”).
304. Id.
305. See Exelon Corp., 234 Ill. 2d at 302-303 (Thomas, J., specially
concurring) (stating that “our system demands that we adhere to our prior
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Courts will typically follow precedent, even when judges disagree
with it.306 This, however, leads to predicaments like the one at issue
here. Despite the unjustness of the law, courts follow Davis in the
name of precedence.307 Some judges believe that stare decisis means
it is more important that “the applicable rule of law be settled than
it be settled right.”308 Courts, however, are not stuck with
precedent. When holdings become “unworkable,” or the deciding
court used poor reasoning to reach the conclusion, the “[C]ourt has
never felt constrained to follow precedent.”309
When the First District discussed Davis, Justice Hyman
encouraged trial courts to continue to go above and beyond the law
by offering a statement of reasons.310 By encouraging this conduct,
appellate justices protect defendants and the justice system. Their
encouragement can also be taken as a sign that a statement of
reasons does not impede on a judge’s ability to perform judicial
duties. Their words, however, have taken our system as far as they
can. Without the Supreme Court mandating it, trial courts will
continue down the road Justice Simon foresaw almost forty years
ago.311
It has now been nearly four decades since the Supreme Court
has handed down Davis. “Our supreme court in Davis . . . did not
intend for acceptable judicial practice to completely omit all
reference to the statutory standards when pronouncing
punishment.”312 Whatever the Davis court’s legal reasoning might
have been in 1982, it has resulted in severely unjust results in
modern sentencing practices. If a court finds other legal reasoning
“intrinsically sounder,” it may depart from the questionable
precedent.313
interpretations.”). The Illinois Supreme Court then notes that the duty to revise
statute falls on the legislature, not the court. Id. at 303.
306. People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312, 338 (2000).
307. Bryant, 2016 IL App (1st) 140421 at ¶ 26 (“Precedent requires me to
concur with the majority’s holding that the sentencing court did not err in
imposing Bryant’s sentence.”).
308. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d at 361 (Freeman, J., dissenting) (quoting Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991)) (internal citations omitted). This
language originally came from a 1932 United States Supreme Court case. Id. at
363. In Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932), Justice
Brandeis, joined by Justices Roberts and Cardozo put forth this idea in a
dissent. Id. The Court then addressed it again in Payne, slightly qualifying the
statement. Payne, 501 U.S. at 827-28.
309. Payne, 501 U.S. at 827-28. The Supreme Court of the United States
spoke of itself, but the same logic can apply to the Illinois Supreme Court.
310. Bryant, 2016 IL App (1st) 140421 at ¶ 35.
311. Jackson, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 804-05 (McDade, J., concurring). Justice
McDade voiced concern that sentencing has turned into an afterthought and
will continue to be so until the Supreme Court changes Davis. Id.
312. Id. at 809.
313. Cf. Brief for Petitioner at 41, Ramos v. Louisiana, No. 18-5924 (United
States Supreme Court argued Oct. 7, 2019) (citing Helvering v. Hallock, 309
U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (stating stare decisis does not require adherence to
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Defendant-Appellants occasionally argue that the Appellate
Court should follow the reasoning of Justices Hyman, Wright, and
McDade, instead of that in Davis.314 Appellate justices pled with the
Illinois Supreme Court, 315 setting the case up for an appeal. The
Supreme Court should revisit Davis by hearing a case similar to the
hypothetical described in the introduction of this comment. This
type of case best illustrates the injustice done to defendants by
Davis. As the federal courts chip away at their own standard,316 the
facts of the case should be similar to those in Rita or Shoffner. By
hearing an analogous case, the Court can root its own reasoning in
that used by the United States Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit.
The Court should examine cases such as Davis, Shoffner and other
federal cases, and state cases from Nevada, Wisconsin, and other
states with comparable standards. Then, after discussing and
relying on decisions which allow the reversal of precedence, it
should reverse its decision in Davis.
After deciding Davis should be overturned to increase judicial
transparency, foster justice, and ensure the other benefits discussed
earlier in this comment, the Illinois Supreme Court should adopt
the framework outlined in Shoffner.317 In the hypothetical described
above, the sentencing judge offers far less explanation than the
second sentencing judge in Shoffner.318 Under Shoffner, the
sentencing court must do more than acknowledge it considered both

precedent that “colli[ded] with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope,
intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience”). The Petitioner in Ramos
argued that the Sixth Amendment’s right to a unanimous jury verdict should
be incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process clause. Id. at 15. Part of Petitioner’s argument focused on the narrowly
decided 1972 case Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). Id. at 34. In a 5-4
decision, Justice Powell’s “outcome-determinative” vote held that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the Sixth Amendment requirement
of jury unanimity against the states. Id. (citing Apocada, 406 U.S. at 404).
Justice Powell rejected prior precedent when reaching his decision, which
Petitioner labeled a “fluke of voting”. Id. Because it “flouted then-existing
precedent and has since been squarely repudiated,” Petitioner argued for the
overturn of Apocada. Id. at 40-41. Similarly, legal and psychological theories
have since refuted the Davis court decision. Justice Powell abruptly broke from
“carefully reasoned precedent” and “declined . . . to follow . . . established
consensus” in his concurrence in Apocada. Id. at 41. Although the Davis court
did not break from carefully reasoned precedent, Illinois has subsequently
declined to follow the established consensus of the federal government and
many state governments regarding a statement of reasons. The reasoning
argued by the Petitioner in Ramos was derived from a foundation of caselaw
and can be followed in this instance.
314. Davis, 2019 IL App (1st) 160408 at ¶¶ 82.
315. Bryant, 2016 IL App (1st) 140421 at ¶ 35 (Hyman, J., concurring)
(stating “I hope our supreme court sees fit to consider this issue and formulate
a court rule to get around its decision in Davis.”).
316. Rita, 551 U.S. at 381-82.
317. Shoffner, 942 F.3d at 823-24.
318. Id. at 821-22.
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sides’ arguments, the statutory factors, and the PSI report.319 In the
hypothetical, the sentencing judge simply stated he considered the
arguments and sentencing factors. This clearly does not meet the
Seventh Circuit standard, and the Illinois Supreme Court should
remand for further explanation.
Even if the judge had stated what factors he had considered,
the statement of reasoning would still fall short of the standard set
out in Shoffner. “As a threshold matter,” the sentencing court must
explain how it assessed the statutory factors.320 This does not
require the sentencing judge to provide a lengthy explanation, but
he or she should at least briefly explain which factors it considered
and how it weighed those factors. This will prevent further remands
and appeals, directly addressing Justice Kennedy’s concerns about
judicial economy as discussed above.321
Furthermore, the Illinois Supreme Court should look at the
arguments made by the public defender during the sentencing
hearing on behalf of the defendant when considering a remand of
the case. The sentencing judge, perhaps inadvertently, dismissed
the lengthy discussion of the defendant’s rehabilitation and
potential for further rehabilitation. In Shoffner, as it should be in
Illinois state courts, the burden shifts to the court to explain why it
did not consider this factor more favorably.322 Therefore, unless the
sentencing judge provides this explanation, the Court will remand
the hypothetical case.
As our understanding of human learning and justice advances,
it makes little sense to continue to adhere to precedent that directly
contradicts our knowledge. Justice Simon, in 1982, noted that even
small children “demand[] an explanation” when being punished.323
Psychologists now understand that punishments, especially
delayed punishments, require a thorough explanation to be
effective.324 Humans are not rats in boxes who learn from electrical
shocks, but our law still treats defendants as such. Our sense of
justice has evolved over time, but, even as we turn towards
rehabilitation, Illinois law lags behind. With no explanation,
rehabilitation becomes more difficult for the defendant. This new
information supports overturning Davis and creating a new law
that more closely aligns with what the scientific community knows
about human behavior and what the legal community understands
about justice — this would-be sound reasoning that the Davis
majority seemingly never considered.

319. Id. at 823.
320. Id.
321. Chavez-Mesa, 138 S. Ct. at 1971 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
322. Shoffner, 942 F.3d at 823.
323. Davis, 93 Ill.2d at 163 (Simon, J., dissenting).
324. Meindl & Casey, supra note 266, at 138.
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V. CONCLUSION
The world has changed greatly from 1982, but the Illinois
Supreme Court’s interpretation of 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-50(c) has
remained the same despite overwhelming proof that it should
change. The appellate courts continue to follow Davis, occasionally
critiquing it or asking for it to be circumvented, and trial courts
provide less explanation for sentencing as time goes on. The law has
become unworkable and only ensures that appellate courts cannot
follow the constitution without trial courts going beyond the simple
requirements of the law. The scant, unsound logic has created an
injustice that wreaks havoc on the criminal justice system.
For almost forty years, the holding in Davis has gone largely
unnoticed by the legal system. Few law review articles have cited
Davis at all, and none have discussed it in depth to analyze and
critique its holding. The appellate court cites it briefly when
defendants raise the issue on appeal, but pass it off as precedent.
We need to reengage with Davis and question it. What did not work
in 1982 still does not work today and represents one more broken
piece in the system that needs to be addressed and fixed. Trial
courts can continue to go above and beyond, as Justice Hyman has
suggested,325 but Justice Simon’s voice still resonates from his
dissent: “[T]he absence, or refusal, of reasons is a hallmark of
injustice,” and, for the sake of defendants, our judicial system, and
society as a whole, it needs to end.326

325. Bryant, 2016 IL App (1st) 140421 at ¶ 35.
326. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d at 163 (Simon, J., dissenting).

